DC is Where Zal Should Sing
Amidst all the BIG things happening on the US political landscape—specially inside the Bush Administration, take the exit of Donald Rumsfeld and now John Bolton—one such not so on the radar potential change seems to be the fate of Zalmay Khalilzad. There are speculations and reports on Zal’s flight from Iraq and his return to Washington—replacing Bolton at the UN, or becoming Condi’s deputy, a post that is vacant for months now, are in the pipeline as reported. There are, cheerfully, no credible or quasi-credible words out there that hint of Zal going back to Kabul. His return to Washington is the best thing that can happen to Afghanistan in this context, and in that sense to the US. I should explain why I think his return to Kabul is not a good idea.
But before that:
Though I don’t have very black and white type take on Zalmay Khalilzad in Afghanistan, I am by no standards a critic of Zal and his policies in Afghanistan—on the contrary I think he did in Afghanistan what no one could have: scaring and encircling potential troublemakers, in the process transforming them into—somewhat of—stakeholders in the current set-up. I also credit him for making the transformation process, achieved perpendicularly by the threat of US B52s, look like an Afghan orchestrated design. He, to say the least, offered those who had no option but to surrender to his demands the luxury of believing that they are not surrendering to US forces but to a fellow Afghan. Which I would claim made their coming around less painful for them and specially for the ordinary people they were living amongst, who could have easily got caught in the middle of any bloody surrender and suffered further--as has been the case in Afghanistan for years now.
In my opinion it will be absurd to critique what Zal did or allowed to happen in Afghanistan—accommodating almost everyone, including some grim face, in the post-Bonn process—by looking in retrospect at what has happened since Bonn 2001. If we allow ourselves to do so, we comfortably ignore the fact that the biggest threat to Afghanistan in 2002, 2003 and even 2004 was political instability forced by the so called warlords in the new system, not a Taliban insurgency. And I don’t think you can create stability or create a system by alienating more people—I mean alienating the so called warlords from power in the short-run. A sort of de-worlordization of Afghanistan, like de-bathification of Iraq, was neither possible nor free of huge risks. Much of the critique at his designs in Bonn and post-Bonn are directed at his practice of allying US power with anyone in Afghanistan, General Dostum, Marshall Fahim, Hazrat Ali, Shirzai and who not. I believe he had but few other options. I have less gripe with that for I understand he seemed to have a plan for how to sideline such figures as the ones mentioned above in the long-run. Once immensely feared Marshall Fahim is now far less strong than he was in 2002 and 2003—and from what is out there in the public domain of information Zal archestered his eventual exit from the government.
Enough of a critique of Zal’s critics—back to why he will be effective in DC than Kabul:
His past success should not be interpreted as if he is the antidote to the current wave of instability in Afghanistan, Southern Afghanistan to be specific—an instability which, to notice, was absent at this magnitude during his time in Kabul. The nature of the current situation is such that he will serve Afghanistan and the US interests in Afghanistan better if he stays in Washington rather than a return to Kabul:
· He is a policy heavyweight with ears open for the mouth he has—Washington is where that mouth has to sing. Least he will be close to people like Megan O’Sullivan and will inevitably enlighten her on real-world conflicts and potential solutions to them.
· His return to Kabul might further provoke Pakistan. Confrontation doesn’t look a way forward to me—trust building, backed by tough-talk from Washington not Kabul—might work. He has few friends in Pakistan, though of course he can’t be blamed for it. Pakistan doesn’t like him for he said in 2004 what others have started to say today—that Pakistan is, at best, hesitant about her approach towards the Taliban.
· The central government of President Karzai has come far enough to have at least attracted the criticism of the populace for the poor conditions they are living in. Criticism is not what Karzai would hope for from the people—but he must be noticing that it is definitely a sign that people recognize his government as the channel to look up to and direct demands at. What should happen next is to establish the government as an entity that delivers, and an entity that can demand things from the people too—the least, taxes. Zal’s return will once again make the US Embassy the center of public focus, and leave the government not even worthy of the public criticism it now lives with. Such a scenario will be very detrimental for any long term project of state building in Afghanistan.
But before that:
Though I don’t have very black and white type take on Zalmay Khalilzad in Afghanistan, I am by no standards a critic of Zal and his policies in Afghanistan—on the contrary I think he did in Afghanistan what no one could have: scaring and encircling potential troublemakers, in the process transforming them into—somewhat of—stakeholders in the current set-up. I also credit him for making the transformation process, achieved perpendicularly by the threat of US B52s, look like an Afghan orchestrated design. He, to say the least, offered those who had no option but to surrender to his demands the luxury of believing that they are not surrendering to US forces but to a fellow Afghan. Which I would claim made their coming around less painful for them and specially for the ordinary people they were living amongst, who could have easily got caught in the middle of any bloody surrender and suffered further--as has been the case in Afghanistan for years now.
In my opinion it will be absurd to critique what Zal did or allowed to happen in Afghanistan—accommodating almost everyone, including some grim face, in the post-Bonn process—by looking in retrospect at what has happened since Bonn 2001. If we allow ourselves to do so, we comfortably ignore the fact that the biggest threat to Afghanistan in 2002, 2003 and even 2004 was political instability forced by the so called warlords in the new system, not a Taliban insurgency. And I don’t think you can create stability or create a system by alienating more people—I mean alienating the so called warlords from power in the short-run. A sort of de-worlordization of Afghanistan, like de-bathification of Iraq, was neither possible nor free of huge risks. Much of the critique at his designs in Bonn and post-Bonn are directed at his practice of allying US power with anyone in Afghanistan, General Dostum, Marshall Fahim, Hazrat Ali, Shirzai and who not. I believe he had but few other options. I have less gripe with that for I understand he seemed to have a plan for how to sideline such figures as the ones mentioned above in the long-run. Once immensely feared Marshall Fahim is now far less strong than he was in 2002 and 2003—and from what is out there in the public domain of information Zal archestered his eventual exit from the government.
Enough of a critique of Zal’s critics—back to why he will be effective in DC than Kabul:
His past success should not be interpreted as if he is the antidote to the current wave of instability in Afghanistan, Southern Afghanistan to be specific—an instability which, to notice, was absent at this magnitude during his time in Kabul. The nature of the current situation is such that he will serve Afghanistan and the US interests in Afghanistan better if he stays in Washington rather than a return to Kabul:
· He is a policy heavyweight with ears open for the mouth he has—Washington is where that mouth has to sing. Least he will be close to people like Megan O’Sullivan and will inevitably enlighten her on real-world conflicts and potential solutions to them.
· His return to Kabul might further provoke Pakistan. Confrontation doesn’t look a way forward to me—trust building, backed by tough-talk from Washington not Kabul—might work. He has few friends in Pakistan, though of course he can’t be blamed for it. Pakistan doesn’t like him for he said in 2004 what others have started to say today—that Pakistan is, at best, hesitant about her approach towards the Taliban.
· The central government of President Karzai has come far enough to have at least attracted the criticism of the populace for the poor conditions they are living in. Criticism is not what Karzai would hope for from the people—but he must be noticing that it is definitely a sign that people recognize his government as the channel to look up to and direct demands at. What should happen next is to establish the government as an entity that delivers, and an entity that can demand things from the people too—the least, taxes. Zal’s return will once again make the US Embassy the center of public focus, and leave the government not even worthy of the public criticism it now lives with. Such a scenario will be very detrimental for any long term project of state building in Afghanistan.
posted by 'Askar Gu-raiz' at
10:51 PM
5 Comments:
I don't think anyone in the post-Bonn process had any illusions as to who they were "surrendering" to. Afghans know how to play hardball (or else why would the Russians be the first to enter Kabul and set-up "a hospital" protected by their hated advanced guard units -- the ones that went around doing much of the damage during the Afghan war? Wouldn't that rub the "Afghan pride" on the wrong side? It should but it didn't, because it was an astute move to give the upper hand to their allies in the Northern Alliance and keep American bombers at bay.) So, I think giving Khalilzad credit on that account is slightly off-base.
I will get around to your other points later.
Thanks for the comment Dragon fly.
While they might have not had any illusions as to who they were surrendering to, they were, quite clearly, offered the luxury to make it look not like a surrender but a cooperation with a 'fellow Afghan.' The other alternative would have been a hawk—not that Zal might not be one—who would have threatened them into surrender and not bothered about making them and himself look like winners. Zal managed to make those who came around look and feel like winners—and that is crucial to any such process, the process of creating stability.
Also—please elaborate a bit further on the Russian case you have mentioned above. I am unable see what you are getting at through a reference to the Russian’s 'setting up a hospital…'
And one more point: Looking forward to your comments on other parts of the post.
Thanks,
this good analysis sounds - in my ears- as if the whole worrisome of "Afghan"s had to do with one larger than life issue: to whom are we supposed to pretend to surrender? If that was the case,then , with the deteriorating situation of this fellow Afghan's birthplace,people must have logically arrived at the conclusion that a rescuer(preferably an afghan of power and talent)is needed for help. If that is the reality, let it interrupt the broken conversation that has started between the lame feet and the earless head.
Agreed that there is an overstatement of the surrender issue—I think it would have served the analysis well had I focused more on the idea that many were made to feel winners, or at least look like winners. We learn, so next time shall be less fluctuating an analysis—or just humble viewpoint.
As to the need for a ‘rescuer’—I am not very clear about it, but I shall state that I think much preferred would be a continued systematic stability , as opposed to the production or introduction of new ‘rescuers’ or resurgence of the old ones.
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