Khalilzad, Again.

You will accuse me of stalking Zalmay Khalilzad—do so. You are missing a lot if you are not stalking him.

On a day when Zal appeared in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee seeking approval as the nominee for Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN, Jawad Zarif, Iran’s kind of Permanent Representative to the UN, went on record with this:

"We could start with two premises," he says. "One, that Iran has the right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Two, that Iran should never move in the direction of building nuclear weapons."
Yes, but how to guarantee that the technology is not used for illicit purposes? Zarif builds on an approach that Iran floated last October. "Iran could agree that its nuclear facilities, including all of its enrichment plants, could be jointly owned by an international consortium. All countries with concerns, including the U.S., could participate in that consortium. Their people and other foreign nationals could come and go to work at the facilities, which would allow for the best type of monitoring." Time


I don’t see it as a coincidence that Zalmay Khalilzad broke the ice in US-Iran relations in the Iraqi saga. I was convinced that his farewell to Baghdad won’t be quite and without a milestone, and there it came: he took the ‘Good First Step’ in ‘engaging’ with Iran.

At a time when there is considerable consensus on the Capitol Hill and around DC in respect to ‘engaging’ with Iraq’s neighbors, and knowing Khalilzad’s will for engagements—with Iran at least—the praise he courted today might mean he will take it far. This time in New York. Not Kabul or Baghdad. Perhaps Jawad Zarif knew what was coming, and that is why he invited Time Magazine…

(On one cold December evening I asked an Afghan Official in New York about what he though Khalilzad’s UN role will do for Afghanistan. I was relieved to hear a sober answer: not much, but certainly a welcomed development. He will be a good source to seek support from, though one understands his time won’t allow for much.)

Continuing the Afghan Amnesty Debate

This response to a comment on my previous entry I thought deserved a solo posting here:

Jawed, welcome and thanks for the comments. I think you are making a strong point that institutional justification of past hostilities will yield less good. But I am not sure what we mean here by ‘peace as a state of mind.’ I would be more concerned with the practical matters that are at stake now, such as security and stability, which do demand a compromise one way or the other.

My main concern is that victims are going unacknowledged in Afghanistan. The climate of fear that rules the minds of the victims and alleged perpetrators of the past three decades doesn’t help in allowing those who might come forward in a South African or Eritrean style plea for forgiveness, to come forward, confess and seek forgiveness. Should there be no threat of their persecution or execution, they might come forward and reconcile with the populace through humble apologies. Humble apologies is the most we can expect to get out of them—and quite frankly, I am no fan of hangings, or ‘doing justice’ through any form of punishment.

Conversely, a good friend and sober head when it comes to these matters, made a strong point: ‘psychological security’ for those threatened by ‘justice’ will help decrease the threat they pose to the families of the victims, and the institutions that are trying to document that grave chapter of our history. Unless we secure the environment for people to come forward, tell their stories and leave them behind and move on, we will continue hanging in an uncertain environment—and one day the alleged perpetrators and the poor victims will be there no more, the victims will go unacknowledged and a chapter of our history that embodies great lessons for all of us will go undocumented.

So some modifications to the proposed charter, such as an action clause—preferably to be the starting clause—that would call on all parties involved to seek forgiveness for their responsibility in the devastation and bloodshed of the decades in question, and a clause proclaiming the rightful place of our ordinary people as the main heroes of the past three decades for enduring the ugliness that was thrown at them from all ends, will make the document and the move less controversial and more acceptable. Also, needless to say that article seven of the charter is not legally savvy at all and needs to go away.

And then, take the example of Argentina, any such charter or law is abolishable once the right environment for accountability and ‘justice’ is set.

Jihadis, Amnesty and the Wolesi Jirga…

The recent charter/resolution ratified by the lower house of the Afghan parliament/Wolesi Jirga, aimed at offering impunity to all parties involved in Afghanistan’s bloody past three decades, has had extensive media coverage. Much of the media coverage, locally and internationally, has been critical of the notion. While there is merit for criticism, it is important to mention that the substance of the notion is at best very raw. The document has to go through the upper house/Mesharno Jirga, and be signed into law by the President.

I believe the mere debate around the hostilities of the past three decades, and the indirect confession that parties involved in those wars shoulder responsibility for the destruction and bloodshed, yet are entitled to forgiveness, is a positive start. I think the resolution will not look as ugly as we feared it can be if a couple of amendments are introduced to it, and a slight change of language happens. And let’s admit, once the Wolesi Jirga sat in session, our biggest nightmare was that the faces of civil war will proclaim themselves—only themselves—immune to legal persecutions. They have actually done better by coming up with a charter that entitles their opponents to what they once regarded as their sole right. It should show, if anything, that there is potential to build on this start, and begin a healing process.

I am offering a humble translation of the text of the resolution. Now check the charter, and I will come back with more later…. ( A Dari version of the Charter is available on AfghanAasmai and Payam-e-Mujahid.)
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The Charter for Compromise and National Reconciliation

In the name of God, the Merciful the Compassionate

The history of humankind, in the midst of its rise and descents, has witnessed bitter destructive incidents of war and conflicts as people or governments confronted. Afghanistan has been no exception to this rule. Throughout her political history, this land has been subject to violations by the worldly powerful, and this nation has sacrificed man and money to defend this land and river from foreign transgressions.

The people of Afghanistan witnessed two foreign offenses during the past twenty eight years. From the north came the former Soviet Union. From the south we are witnessing a transgression of transnational terrorists. The destruction and bloodshed has lasted more than two decades, and war’s deadly shadow still threatens the communal and individual lives of the people.

Attentive of hardship in the future, the spread of war in parts of the country, and the stretch of distrust between different layers of the current society, more than ever before, our nation is in need of an inclusive design for stability and national compromise. Every war ends with peace, and every comprise can be tailored proportionate to and based on the beliefs, culture and traditions of the particular country.

To reach an assured compromise and an endpoint to war and devastation, Afghanistan’s state and people can profit if inspired by two patterns and roadmaps:

• Considering their Islamic origin, after Mecca’s conquest the prophet’s example of amnesty to all those who had fought Islam and the Muslims;

• Considering their political life and governing system that is acute to third world countries, the pattern of compromise in South Africa and the neighboring Tajikistan based on compromise and forgiveness.

To this date, decrees issued and conventions signed towards the goal of peace and coexistence have been effective on different scales, they include the Decree on Total Amnesty issued by President Sebghatullah Mujadidi during his Interim Government of 1371, the 1380 Bonn Agreement on Reconciliation and Settlement between all political factions , the 1372 decree on Total amnesty for the pleading elements of the Taliban, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai’s 1384 decree on the establishment of Commission for Peace and Islamic Brotherhood. However, in order to solidify peace and stability in the country, and in order to assure all parties involved of their safety in the event of their compliance with the constitution and laws current in the country, lawful and transparent steps need to be taken. The basis for distrust needs to be uprooted, and all people, political and ideological factions, be mobilized towards strengthening peace and stability.

As per the efforts of the Muslim nation of Afghanistan, the three main pillars of the state, the Legislative, Judicial and Executive are now in place. Towards the settlement of peace and stability, safeguarding greater national interests of the country, ending past and current enmities, and offering an inclusive solution that encompasses all sides which can be a realistic answer to the serious needs of our Islamic country, the National Assembly/Shurai-Mili ratifies the following articles as the Charter for Compromise and Coexistence between all the residents of this land:

1. The Jihad, Resistance and just struggles of our people represent glittering summits of our country’s history. They are considered as the outstanding national prides of our people. They ought to be revered. Those involved be appreciated. They should be treated suitably within the framework of the Islamic Republic, and be safeguarded against any harassments.

2. Every political faction, or sides engaged in conflicts with each other one way or the other during the past two and a half decades, are included in the national reconciliation and amnesty program; and they are immune to judicial or legal prosecutions, for the purpose of reconciliation between different layers of the society, strengthening peace and stability, and a new beginning in contemporary political life of the country.

3. The invalid reports by Human Rights Watch, in regards to the Jihadi leaders and national personalities of the country, are derived from dubious intentions, and the National Assembly proclaims them void.

4. All people involved in armed opposition to the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, upon their merge with the national reconciliation process and their respect for the constitution and laws current in the country, are entitled to the merits and benefits of Article II of this charter.

5. This charter entails no exception to any group or political course.

6. Forming a high level commission by the Wolesi Jirga is called for to pave the grounds for the opposition’s merge with the strengthening stability and national compromise process. This in order to assist in ending violence and distrust between the government and the armed opponents of the government, and in order for strengthening compromise and stability.

7. Upon the establishment of the National Assembly, all international laws and conventions have been compared with the national constitution, and the people and government of Afghanistan are obliged to obey only the laws that get ratified by the National Assembly.

8. Afghanistan’s Wolesi Jirga calls on all armed opponents of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to join the strengthening stability and national comprise process in order for strengthening peace and stability and bringing and end to wars.

9. Afghanistan’s Wolesi Jirga does not consider mining or fencing along the Durand line as a suitable way of combating and controlling terrorism. Terrorism must be controlled and combated in its training, equipping and financing centers.

10. Wolesi Jirga, stressing independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, sees cordial relations with neighboring countries as one of its priorities and earnestly seeks to realize it.

11. Mass media should be attentive of the substance of the Charter for National Compromise, and they shall strive for strengthening peace and national reconciliation.

12. The Charter on National Compromise and Reconciliation is ratified in eleven articles and proclaimed effective.

"The pyramid of Afghanistan government's legitimacy..."

One of the smartest statements made in relations to Afghanistan recently is this Amrullah Saleh quote from Barnett Rubin’s ‘Saving Afghanistan’, and I think people need to understand how critical what he refers to is.

"The pyramid of Afghanistan government's
legitimacy," he wrote, "should not be brought down due to our inefficiency
in knowing the enemy, knowing ourselves and applying resources
effectively."

The potential for losing what is left of the legitimacy the state in Afghanistan has is great, and less is being done to deter that potential from prevailing.

Take this as a case in point:

At a time when the public is becoming increasingly disillusioned with the state, our tie, turban and teikrai* wearing parliamentarians spend the day which marks their first anniversary as a house not with their constituencies or the general public, but reporting to ‘donor countries and their representatives’. ** The double-edged pity here is that the Afghan parliamentarians, perhaps out of the fear that the pipeline which fuels their cars and warms their pockets might go dry on them, consider themselves accountable not to their constituency but a group of foreign check writers in Kabul. While I understand it is vital to have the donors on board, and less in Afghanistan is possible without them, the satisfaction of donor community with parliament’s performance need not be confused with what the motives of having a parliament in place are for either side; the Afghan state as a whole, and the countries involved in Afghanistan.

And it appears the self-proclaimed well-versed-in-democracy and state building foreign diplomats in Kabul are bothered less by having their parliamentarian friends around them on the parliament’s anniversary, rather then in their constituencies. I have seen nothing that suggests a donor representative asked the parliamentarians to hold their constituencies tight, an act that will serve both ends. Reporting to a Japanese or British diplomat in Kabul will not yield what is needed most at this juncture; public support for and confidence in the government. Nor will it deter stone shots at anything government or foreign if the public grows further disillusioned. It is time to put an end to the feel-good kind reports, and conference room state building. Send them to sharana, Yaka-w-lang and Tagab or Ghorband, rather than inviting them to London, Brussels and DC.


* Tiekrai is the Pashto word for the scarf.
** The private TV channel Ariana, broadcasting from Kabul, a gathering of MPs and the donor community in Kabul to report on the parliament's one year work.

(I would play further with the Saleh’s quotation and change the order of his recommendations—‘knowing ourselves’ should take precedents on the rest of what he prescribes.)

They Call This Pragmatism (I guess)

Today’s NYT reports the US is holding Iranians seized in raids inside Iraq. This comes after a day when Ahmadenejad sounded more defiant than ever before not to alter the Iranian nuclear course.

At this moment I got nothing to offer in relation to Ahmadenejad or the US holding Iranians in Iraq, but I was instantaneously reminded of a reversal of this headline, which should have featured on NYT, but I guess never did.

The Marines called it, in an MSNBC report, ‘operation airlift of evil’ and Seymour Hersh titled his piece on it ‘The Getaway.’ Most recently, Barnett Rubin came out saying it happened. I am talking about the Kunduz airlift of November 2001. The US allows one country to salvage thousands of fighters who are fighting for roughly the same ends, and bluntly denies even having any knowledge of such repulsive act. In a different theater, Iraq, it holds four not so different dudes and throws them into headlines.

Believe me when I earnestly say that I am not the usual guy with an accent who would yell double-standards whenever a US foreign policy issue is debated. But on this occasion, I just wonder what you call such an inconsistency in behavior. Pragmatism?

If this is pragmatism, then lets go back to the good old days of black and white—and either and or. I just don't think pragmatism helps if this is what it is like.

---I was in the middle of sketching a piece on the US’s lousy record in relation to Taliban, and I saw this headline…couldn’t stop myself from exhausting some of my vital research links for that piece on this rapid response.

Return, With a Change

Final days of an academic semester are intense for an undergraduate of my type. I had to merge the discrepancy of what I learn during a semester and what I need to remember for exams. Such a venture kept me away from the blogsphere at a time when I had just become somewhat regular. Needless to say I missed writing on matters that are close to my keyboard.

As things stand now, and the best projection I can make for the next seven weeks, I will be regular.

And if you haven’t noticed, the blog title has changed. Though I still believe that demilitarized warlords we all remain, I have moved to a different level in my wild generalizations. Somewhere in us there is an Askar Gu-raiz.

‘Askar Guraiz’—a Dari phrase—isolated from its context and roughly translated means truant conscript.

Recycled history and context for the new title:

The Afghan Army under the Moscow backed regime(s) of seventies and eighties was a conscription Army. Every male citizen—or subject of the state—was to serve a mandatory term, and remain in reserves for another. Such a norm gave rise to the Askar Gu-raiz phenomenon. Young men of service age, some disillusioned with the State and its ideology, for others the opportunity cost of service greater, and most possessing the general reluctance to enlist, either went into hiding or deserted the country. Those truants were officially called Asker Gu-raiz .A good number of them reached Pakistan and Iran. Some from this group became foot soldiers in the dissident’s fight against the Kabul regime between late 70s and early 90s.

The new and hopefully lasting title—Askar Gu-raiz—embodies no value judgments of the past contexts in which this phrase was deployed.

In fact, my Askar Gu-raiz title, clearly sparked by a level of guilt, is concerned with the immediate. Should you be interested in knowing more about the switch of titles, drop me a note.

DC is Where Zal Should Sing

Amidst all the BIG things happening on the US political landscape—specially inside the Bush Administration, take the exit of Donald Rumsfeld and now John Bolton—one such not so on the radar potential change seems to be the fate of Zalmay Khalilzad. There are speculations and reports on Zal’s flight from Iraq and his return to Washington—replacing Bolton at the UN, or becoming Condi’s deputy, a post that is vacant for months now, are in the pipeline as reported. There are, cheerfully, no credible or quasi-credible words out there that hint of Zal going back to Kabul. His return to Washington is the best thing that can happen to Afghanistan in this context, and in that sense to the US. I should explain why I think his return to Kabul is not a good idea.

But before that:

Though I don’t have very black and white type take on Zalmay Khalilzad in Afghanistan, I am by no standards a critic of Zal and his policies in Afghanistan—on the contrary I think he did in Afghanistan what no one could have: scaring and encircling potential troublemakers, in the process transforming them into—somewhat of—stakeholders in the current set-up. I also credit him for making the transformation process, achieved perpendicularly by the threat of US B52s, look like an Afghan orchestrated design. He, to say the least, offered those who had no option but to surrender to his demands the luxury of believing that they are not surrendering to US forces but to a fellow Afghan. Which I would claim made their coming around less painful for them and specially for the ordinary people they were living amongst, who could have easily got caught in the middle of any bloody surrender and suffered further--as has been the case in Afghanistan for years now.

In my opinion it will be absurd to critique what Zal did or allowed to happen in Afghanistan—accommodating almost everyone, including some grim face, in the post-Bonn process—by looking in retrospect at what has happened since Bonn 2001. If we allow ourselves to do so, we comfortably ignore the fact that the biggest threat to Afghanistan in 2002, 2003 and even 2004 was political instability forced by the so called warlords in the new system, not a Taliban insurgency. And I don’t think you can create stability or create a system by alienating more people—I mean alienating the so called warlords from power in the short-run. A sort of de-worlordization of Afghanistan, like de-bathification of Iraq, was neither possible nor free of huge risks. Much of the critique at his designs in Bonn and post-Bonn are directed at his practice of allying US power with anyone in Afghanistan, General Dostum, Marshall Fahim, Hazrat Ali, Shirzai and who not. I believe he had but few other options. I have less gripe with that for I understand he seemed to have a plan for how to sideline such figures as the ones mentioned above in the long-run. Once immensely feared Marshall Fahim is now far less strong than he was in 2002 and 2003—and from what is out there in the public domain of information Zal archestered his eventual exit from the government.

Enough of a critique of Zal’s critics—back to why he will be effective in DC than Kabul:

His past success should not be interpreted as if he is the antidote to the current wave of instability in Afghanistan, Southern Afghanistan to be specific—an instability which, to notice, was absent at this magnitude during his time in Kabul. The nature of the current situation is such that he will serve Afghanistan and the US interests in Afghanistan better if he stays in Washington rather than a return to Kabul:

· He is a policy heavyweight with ears open for the mouth he has—Washington is where that mouth has to sing. Least he will be close to people like Megan O’Sullivan and will inevitably enlighten her on real-world conflicts and potential solutions to them.

· His return to Kabul might further provoke Pakistan. Confrontation doesn’t look a way forward to me—trust building, backed by tough-talk from Washington not Kabul—might work. He has few friends in Pakistan, though of course he can’t be blamed for it. Pakistan doesn’t like him for he said in 2004 what others have started to say today—that Pakistan is, at best, hesitant about her approach towards the Taliban.

· The central government of President Karzai has come far enough to have at least attracted the criticism of the populace for the poor conditions they are living in. Criticism is not what Karzai would hope for from the people—but he must be noticing that it is definitely a sign that people recognize his government as the channel to look up to and direct demands at. What should happen next is to establish the government as an entity that delivers, and an entity that can demand things from the people too—the least, taxes. Zal’s return will once again make the US Embassy the center of public focus, and leave the government not even worthy of the public criticism it now lives with. Such a scenario will be very detrimental for any long term project of state building in Afghanistan.

On Sarah Chayes--and her 'The Punishment of Virtue'

Sarah Chayes’s book The Punishment of Virtue made some noise in circles concerned with Afghanistan this year—impressed some, didn’t touch many. I remain unimpressed by the book on many accounts—though I understand it is not a bad addition to the literature that is on Afghanistan. I shall confess that I started reading the book late and skeptically because she came forward to me as this one hippie—organic and feel good kind—of an individual who is after ‘saving the world’. Once I read her book for some reason it looked to me as if the time she spent in Kandahar, Arghandab to be specific, was actually a staged scene for publicity of a book like ‘The Punishment of Virtue’ she was to write. You will curse me for this level of cynicism, but I believe in intellectual cynicism—and Sarah shouldn’t get away with her book easily either. I know the below to prompt my cynicism:

It is 2002 and the US is engaged in Afghanistan. An NPR correspondent covering Afghanistan, Sarah Chayes, is laid off by the radio station for whatever reason. The correspondent comes to NYC and talks to publishers about a book she will write on Afghanistan. Note that she talks to publishers in 2002, and the book is released in 2006. In between these years, back in Afghanistan she ‘shuns Western comforts and insists on living among ordinary Afghans’.

In process of ‘shunning western comfort’ she miraculously gets extraordinary access to high level officials and becomes very much an insider in the Karzai family. The later is not so unprecedented considering the Karzai family’s historic intimacy with journalists. Yet one still remains puzzled about what was the promise for the Karzai family of allowing a laid off journalist the access she got. Whatever the promise may have been, clearly the President and Qayum Karzai should be pitying themselves for the proximity they allowed Sarah to gain to them. She now thinks they have faulty political ethics—or at least the political ethics which she doesn’t want to align with. Of course she says all this after her book is out and she has enough of an image to be able to do in Afghanistan without Qayum Karzai—one would argue. Though she talks of it in the Rediff interview linked above, and a friend of mine who knows Sarah confirms, that Wali Karzai is a different case for her.

The President hinted he was no fan of Sarah Chayes when he answered a question derived out of Sarah’s book at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

It doesn't surprise me at all that people like Karzai might not be fans of her. It is easy to resent a hippiesh former journalist who after spending three years in Afghanistan thinks she knows the country better, and is more sincere to it than almost anyone else in the game, minus the late Khakraizwal. I was stunned reading the part of The Punishment of Virtue which the NYT review also picks up as their beef with the book. Here is the NYT paragraph:

She also has a tendency to lionize some characters and ridicule others, particularly those who do not share her view of Afghanistan. At one point, she asks why Hamid Karzai failed to act quickly to remove the warlords. “Hadn’t we described exactly how to do it in our eight-point plan?” Chayes writes indignantly, referring to a document prepared by her group. “Had he forgotten to read it or something?"

The Sarah Chayes 'eight-point plan' for alienating ‘warlords’ from power in Afghanistan!-she probably thinks they are just like the Woodrow Wilson Fourteen Points for lasting Peace in Europe...


-------------------
Some politics of fear coming up

I have delayed writing on another ‘Punishment of Virtue’—and an indirect promotion of vice—that is happening in Afghanistan for a while. I mean the neglect of central and northern Afghanistan much due to their choice of not revolting and doing with what is there for them. There is an open disregard of the pilled up miseries and threats in that region, and I deem such an attitude as detrimental for the future. The last thing Afghanistan can afford is instability in the rest of the country—and it seems, alas, closer than ever. I will try and ring some warning bells soon. I am advertising my piece on such a topic partly because I want to commit myself to writing it—and partly because I want to push Kate Clark’s upcoming report on Northern Afghanistan, Afghanistan: Never Mind the Taliban. It will be playing on Channel 4 news on Friday December 1 at 7:30 GMT.

Waxing Lyrically about Herat, Ismael Khan and more…

In the Karzai era Afghanistan if you are in search of one replica for development—of a sort—then look no beyond Herat. Herat has emerged as a city with a booming civil society—or so it appears from outside. The youth of the city—to a couple of whom I am acquainted—are models of an emerging intellectual mass amidst the depravity of Afghanistan from intellectual discourse and development.( A honorable mention of Jaghory is imperative in this context.)


Although the nexus of Said Hussain Anwari and Ayub Salangi—respectively the Governor and Police Chief of Herat—is not the neatest one around, even with such administrators, the city—and province more and less in general doesn’t seem to be looking backwards. (Take a look at the first official website of a provincial government in Afghanistan. Anwari and Salangi are exhibiting some prideful photos around potential progress sites. There is less on the website that credits Ismael Khan, the Sardar-e-Jahad-o-Muqawimat, Amir Zone Gharb...and a lot more that in his praise they wax in his circles, for creating the legacy which Awari, the hero in the website’s photo gallery, is trying to inherit.)


Now we leave Herat there, and in praise of Ismael Khan I shall wax:

Ismael Khan has a reputation for getting things done— this amongst some not happy things that he is known for. When convinced, or let’s say coerced, by Zalmai Khalilzad to come to Kabul—and then it was decided he will run the Ministry of Water and Energy—this humble observer from the outside had mixed feelings about such an executive decision. I thought it was imperative to centralize with the government the largely unchecked power figures like Ismael Khan enjoyed. Yet I also feared that a Herat without the Amir might turn unstable. I had confidence that the Amir, reputed for transforming Herat’s fortune after the flight of the Taliban, will seek to deliver wherever he be. But I was not willing to bet money on the prospects of his value at the Ministry of Energy and Water—a place where, I believe, a technocrat with good donor relations will serve better than a populist of the Khan type who has a murky image with the donors.

And let me put this in bold—I am of the conviction that Ismael Khan can make a brilliant Interior Minister. He has many qualities and the experience that he can draw on—to name a few, respect amongst people of different affiliations in Afghanistan, a CV that includes managing a stable and prospering Herat for more than three and half years on his own. On top of all that, for me what makes him a brilliant candidate for the Interior Ministry is the simple fact that he has the charisma, and fear-projecting-factor, which makes troublemakers tremble. His presence in a place like the Interior Ministry will radiate strength—or at least project a strong image of the government. But I also understand that, alas, many stakeholders in Afghanistan are not friends of Ismael Khan and will seek to undermine him—his ,alleged, proximity to Iran is reason enough for them to alienate the man from power.

Ismael Khan’s reputation is being stained by putting him in a place where he can do less on his own. At the Ministry of Energy and Water all depends on the mercy of donors and the brilliance of engineers who can come up with some genius formula to address the lack-of-electricity impasse in Afghanistan. I think it is about time for our government to think boldly about using the sway people like Ismael Khan have on the populace in order to stabilize the government system—rather than putting him in a place where he is being criticized for an inability that is not his, the inability to deliver electricity to homes in Afghanistan. Follow with this LA Times report on Ismael Khan and his Ministry.

If only that long mustache of Nietzsche was a diplomatically correct fashion.

Our Dr. Spanta, I think, models his looks on none other than who seems to be a huge influence on him.

The Noble Attorney General--or The Explosive One?

‘I will receive the noble prize (Which one?) if I manage to take justice to those who have built narco-dollar-palaces in Shairpoor.’
Attorney General Jabbar Sabit

There is a lot more in this event-report. One should translate it into English. Any one following the above link, please report back and tell if you think it is a credible piece--I am skeptical of the reporting ethics some of our online news sources abide by, and this report seems too explosive to be masala-free. I wonder if it will be published in some papers back home! Explosive?

On Five Years since the 'Flight of the Taliban':
Too Many Rambos to Hide...

There was a widely known Taliban-time joke about a barber in our town in Kabul—and perhaps it had made its way in from some other town for ours wasn’t that creative a place, and it read as such: In and around September 1996, on one of the first days the Taliban datsun-ed into Kabul, a Talib-bacha enters a barber shop to warn the barber not to shave beards from that moment onwards. In the shop he is greeted with a wall size poster of our very own—internalized—Rambo, normal good in Kabul barber shops, and the Talib-bacha remembers on spot another purifying message he was to deliver to the town of the contaminated. He asks the barber: Who is the man in the picture with the huge gun and trimmed beard? The barber scared of disclosing the identity of this freedom fighter—Rambo—rumbles that: He is my cousin. The Talib-bacha, ignited as he was by the sight of Rambo's gun, tries to win a heart and delivers a friendly gesture: You can escape punishment if you agree to tell your cousin to surrender his weapon, dress a pe-Shariat-barabar beard, and if you take this photo down...

Five years and some days after that barber incident, on November 13 2001, people in Kabul woke up to a cautious delight, but they were not going to keep poker faces and let the moment pass without a blast. Blasting on bus-tops and in what was left of Samawars around the city was Kheyal-man Yaqeen-man, replacing the Wa Taliba Grana Paam Kawa Kabul Bandai that had scared the city of rend-ha o aatashparcha-ha to an absolute surrender for five years. They woke up convinced that justice of the heavenly had descended, just as any helpless mass would have thought of what they saw on such a day. That the justice they longed for had fallen on the dark mercenaries of the mysterious Datsuns that cursed them, every morning, with pounds of dust and abusive looks. They woke up liberated from the long list of imposed deeds meant to purify the contaminated people of our Afghanistan, the list that is very much common knowledge now…

Yet today, five years after that morning of liberation—call it—it really was, on November 13 2006, our Kabulis and majority of Afghans, who have, mind you, been in contact with some real Rambos—though these ones are not able to dodge 300 rounds of bullets in 120 minutes as Rambo did—wake up haunted by the possible return of those dark forces. As one friend recently said, the metaphor for our time is the state of denial and perhaps I am in such a state for I am convinced they have but the guts to come back to Kabul. In any event, the mere sense of the fear they have projected again is demeaning enough. It is torturous even to be thinking and reading about their possible return.

But better we all know that this time around, should they return, they will have no friendly gestures to offer and they will not seek to win hearts. By now they know very well that the new Rambos in Afghanistan, who in that scary future will have abandoned us and returned to their barracks somewhere in Nebraska or Sussex, were not our cousins. The rootless mercenaries will have another round of purifying the further contaminated in their bags--for me and for you. Needless to say that may such a day not come...

The British Channel 4 has a tale from that day five years ago…the day when the idea of Taliban was for a moment, in words of a Shamali-tal-wala Qumandan-Bacha framed in this video:'Imshalla Khalas.'

Posh Serenity--Reviewed.

While writing the Posh Serenity my memory was failing me. This when I tried to decide whom to credit for the inspiration-- Parween Pazhwak or Samay Hamid. I thought it was either of these two contemporary bulwarks of our literature. Then I received humbling feedback from Hamesha for my hasty playing-around with what he noticed to be Samay Hamid’s below pasted Dari poem. I shall thank him for sharing with me Hamid's work—a piece I had read a while ago back home, and a poem that is clearly the inspiration for my Posh Serenity.

دو رهبر خفته در بین دو بستر
دو عسکر خسته در بین دو سنگر
دو رهبر پشت میز صلح خندان
دو بیرق بر سر گور دو عسکر
از سمیع حامد

Samay Hamid is master-enough to word in four verses what I have tried to say in infinite lines. The below piece—reviewed version of Posh Serenity—is at best a translation of Hamid’s poem around the same theme. But in all fairness to Hamid’s depth of thought, it is my attempt to word what he felt years ago. He cannot be blamed for any uncanny touch the Posh Serenity has embodied. But he can be credited for all the humane touch this piece may project.


Reviewed Version of:

Posh Serenity


Worlds away from the battle
in a serenity rare to our time
two leaders lurk,
luxuriating in linen.

Down in trenches
polluted by the love
…or the promise of it,
two unknowns,
two soldiers , remain strained.

Sooner,
…Or maybe not that soon
behind the serenity stall,
amused
the two will linger,
those same very leaders.

But sooner,
…not any later.

Hovering with unheard cry,
paired flags will fly high
aboard the tombs,
the tombs of the two soldiers.

Those two not to be seen
…strangers to serenity.

Finger Time; In Different Colors

Perhaps you have observed the ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’—sounds a funny phrase now, ha—provoked split inside the Neo-Con Camp. Francis Fukuyama was one the first to show us that there are two sets of Neo-Cons: the Militants and the Non-Militant.

This week Vanity Fair was allowed access to the militant wing. In the Fair piece those good old faces of the Soviet Union time masculine US Foreign Policy and the cheerleaders for ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’, think Richard Perle, have finally come out with fire—and yes they are blaming others for the mess that is Iraq. There is of course a defensive tone in their words. You make your own conclusions on why they are defensive.

Not long ago members of this militant wing were the first to pride themselves on the sights of the blue-colored-thumbs which hit TV screens around the world. Those blue fingers symbolizing, just symbolizing, the apparent birth of Democracy in Iraq. Now they—mostly former members of Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee—have come out showing their own fingers. The only problem is that they are showing the middle finger, and they have tried to hide the ink that is on it—that different color ink.

I have copied two of the damning quotes from the Vanity Fair piece. These people are thought to be the very dark faces in policy circles—but read Eliot Cohen’s quote below, he seems to hold the brightest view on what has come out of their design.

Prele; The Pissed-off: “I'm getting damn tired of being described as an architect of the war. I was in favor of bringing down Saddam. Nobody said, 'Go design the campaign to do that.' I had no responsibility for that.”

Cohen...smiles: “The best news is that the United States remains a healthy, vibrant, vigorous society. So in a real pinch, we can still pull ourselves together.”

Cruel!!!

Just one picture….one can do nothing but cry. Perhaps a sign that there still is some civility left in us…

I remain puzzled... where are those protesters with infinite energy to unleash on what the Pope said or what a paper printed—isn’t this worth a protest, or at least speaking out loud!!!

'An Agenda for Harnessing Globalization'

An imaginative and unorthodox viewpoint. Dr. Ghani and Clare Lockhart seem defiant to make the needed noise.

Here is the Brooking Institute's review of their recent work. An Agenda for Harnessing Globalization

Petro-Politics: Irresistible

Sergei Blagov and Igor Torbakov write of what the Turkmanbashi is up to in : ENERGY ROW LOOMS IN CENTRAL ASIA

The Pipe-line adventurist Thomas Goltz writes "the pipeline to nowhere" reached a destination: HAILING THE PIPELINE TO SOMEWHERE

Stephan Blank overplays the March 2006 findings in Afghan energy reserves: AFGHANISTAN’S ENERGY FUTURE AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS

And read what China thinks of the ‘Great Central Asia’ Strategy:
US scheming for "Great Central Asia" Strategy

The Newsweek saw it:

‘
A Plan for Afghanistan
It is shameful that we've only built one stretch of highway since the Taliban.

’

Posh Serenity

The linen,
Comforts the two leaders

Down in the trench
Fatigued remain,
The two soldiers

Sooner, or maybe not that soon
Behind the serenity stall
Amused the two will linger,
The same very leaders

But sooner, not any later
Paired flags, mastering the winds
Will fly high

Aboard the two tombs,
The tombs of the two soldiers

Hold me to this: You will forget the Middle East...

I foresee the below and hold me to the prediction, if you may—in a decade:

In the next two decades if you did not forget about the geo-political significance of the Middle East, and did not end up finding yourself deeply intoxicated by Central Asia’s geo-importance and the staged struggles for influence by multiple actors in this region, you would at least have two parallel—in importance—geographies that will demand greater understanding, for the higher political and economic substance this virtually land-locked region, the Central Asia, will have relayed by then.


The following commentary by Stephen Blank of the US Army War College is just one explanation of why one needs to keep a fixed eye--only if he/she hasn’t already started yet--on the Central Asia:

INDIA: THE NEW CENTRAL ASIAN PLAYER Stephen Blank 6/26/06

Funny, ha!

Somebody has got to tell this ‘brotha’ why is it that India is getting a Nuclear Deal and not Pakistan. A ‘favorite nation.’

"
Congressman Major R. Owens, a Brooklyn Democrat, spoke on the Indo-US nuclear deal. “I don’t understand if we can offer a nuclear deal to India, why can’t we offer a similar deal to Pakistan as well,” he said. “Pakistan is one of our favourite nations.”

"

A ‘Founding Father’ Deprived of Custody

Today the London based daily Financial Times published an article by Dr. Ashraf Ghani. He breaks a momentary silence and provides words of wisdom on the current crucial and challenged phase of the attempts at building a stable and prosperous Afghanistan. The article is pasted at the end of this commentary.

I remain wondering and furious for why would a person of his caliber be marginalized from a phase of our national life when the leaders have to ‘act decisively and become founding fathers of a dignified nation or go down as those who squandered a golden chance.’ Only the pattern of leadership Karzai has adapted, mirrored by the resignation of Ali Ahmad Jalali, the former Interior Minister of Afghanistan now a professor at the DC based National Defense University, can offer some explanation of Ashraf Ghani’s apparent growing distance from the policy circles. Karzai has indeed agglomerated around himself characters less charismatic, and less influential than he himself. Jalali and Ghani had projected the potential for matching Karzai’s, if not charisma, at least influence on the system. Perhaps that is an explanation for why Dr. Ghani is not as vocal and influential in the government today as he was before the 2004 presidential elections.

His efforts as the Chancellor of Kabul University needed be applauded. But while the centrality of Kabul University’s revival to our future can not be exaggerated, limiting Dr. Ghani to only that single duty doesn’t seem promising at all. I hope he is not as out of the policy circle as his writing suggests he is. This piece is written with the prose of an outsider trying to point out to the disillusioned insiders what they ought to do, unlike some of his previous articles where he explained what was being done and why…


Afghanistan has the assets to regain momentum
By Ashraf Ghani
Published: June 19 2006 19:55 Last updated: June 19 2006 19:55

There is an emerging consensus, domestic and international, that Afghanistan is likely to slide into chaos. This misses the central point: there are assets in place that, if organized coherently, could re-establish momentum towards creating a stable, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan. If failure is not an option for the international community, attention must be focused on renewing Afghans’ trust in a bright future to make them active partners in the fight against violence and disorder.

The problem has arisen from failure to adapt to a changed context, loss of momentum in pursuing a credible programme of development and mis-calibrated use of violence. In contrast to 2001, when there was a global consensus on the imperative of stability in Afghanistan, the regional, international and domestic environments have changed. The regional consensus has either frayed or broken, with Pakistan and Afghanistan trading accusations rather than forging the partnership that their mutual interests demand, and Russia, Iran and India sending mixed signals and taking increasingly unilateral approaches. While international consensus on state-building has been forged, the innovative mechanisms of implementation, co-ordination and monitoring required are not yet in place. Meanwhile, the public mood in troop-contributing nations is becoming sceptical of the wisdom of engagement.

Between 2001 and 2005 progress was made towards establishing a legitimate central government that gradually earned the people’s trust. Now the government seems to have lost momentum. It has yet to forge a consensus around an agenda for dealing with current challenges or to build the institutions that can deliver rule of law, security and economic development. The aid system, instead of building the government’s capability, has created a parallel bureaucracy that has forced a brain drain from the government and fuelled the resentment of the population and underpaid civil servants.

While most Afghans suffer immense poverty, a small elite of traffickers and profiteers has amassed fortunes and is corroding the state’s authority. Using the scepticism of the population as an opening, the networks of terror have moved in aggressively. The two theatres of Afghanistan and Iraq are now increasingly co-ordinated with a repertoire of common tactics. But the violence used to control terror is in turn feeding the people’s sense of insecurity.

These negative trends can be arrested. There are assets that can be marshalled. A series of national programmes has been implemented, demonstrating Afghans’ leadership and management capability. Monetary and fiscal reforms were carried out. ­Regulation has been used to secure more than $500m in private sector investment in the telecommunications sector and secure service delivery by the private sector to the population. A medium-term programme of public investments that would generate ­sufficient domestic revenue to provide the financial basis of governance has been prepared. With rising commodity prices, Afghanistan’s deposits of ­copper, iron, marble and coal could make it a significant regional player. Nato’s first deployment outside Europe should leave no doubt about international support.

A new approach requires avoiding obvious traps. Afghanistan and its partners must not perpetuate a blame game; no one participant can solve the problem alone. Neither can they afford to wait, letting the worst happen before taking matters in hand. The temptation of privatising security – whether through militias or private security firms – must be resisted as it would only worsen trust in the rule of law by unleashing unregulated daily violence.

What are the elements of a strategy? Hamid Karzai, president, and his government have a choice: act decisively and become founding fathers of a dignified nation or go down as those who squandered a golden chance. They must show commitment to rule of law and accountability. First, they must establish a supreme court that is a model of independence. Second, they must confront corruption through a commission of Afghan and international people who could investigate allegations at the highest levels and impose sanctions. Third, they must pursue good governance. Fourth, they must build equality of opportunity for the young generation. Fifth, security strategy must be overhauled.

Regional support must be renewed: in particular, Pakistan should be persuaded that stability in Afghanistan provides the basis of its own stability and prosperity. The imbalance between military and developmental expenditure by the international community needs to be redressed, with new mechanisms that would reinvigorate the Afghans’ energies for reconstructing their country. As the key to prosperity lies in regional trade and investment, the Gulf countries could play an important role. While use of force is going to be required, it must be placed within a comprehensive strategy of state-building. The anti-drugs strategy must be revisited to ensure it is aligned with the overall objective.

Contrary to stereotypes, Afghans welcomed the International Security Assistance Force and the coalition with open arms in 2001. With the right measures, this goodwill can and must be regained. Their government and their international partners should have the wisdom, commitment and staying power to deliver solutions rather than yield to self-fulfilling prophecies.

The writer, chancellor of Kabul University, is former finance minister of Afghanistan
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006

Academia in Politics

Michael Ignatieff, the former Carr Professor of Human Rights Practice and now one of Toronto's Liberal MPs in Canada’s Parliament, seems to be striving to put into practice what he for long preached.

In defense of the notion to extend Canada's mission in Afghanistan until 2009, he came out fully powered:

“to prevent human-rights disasters, the world needs more muscular peacekeeping missions that are prepared to return fire with fire, rather than the traditional blue-beret peacekeepers.”

‘Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: An Ever Dangerous Neighborhood’

This is a sober report by the US Institute of Peace on an issue of major concern for us all:

‘Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: An Ever Dangerous Neighborhood’

Here is the link to a summary of it: http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr162_afghanistan.html

Unimaginably Irrational

"آنچه كه سياستمداران مخالف دولت را از دست بردن به سلاح و اقدام خشونت آميز بازداشته است دو مسأله است: اول، عدم يك دولت بديل كه در صورت سرنگوني دولت كنوني، دولت ديگري بسرعت بتواند جاي آن را پرسازد. در حال حاضر نيروي آماده براي اشغال جاي دولت كنوني، نيروي طالبان است كه در مقايسه با آن، مــردم افغانستان دولت فعلي را ترجيــح مي دهند." پيام مجاهد. ۱۲ جوزای ۱۳٨۵

"There exists two elements that deter the politicians in opposition to the current government from resorting to guns and violent methods , one being the unavailability of an alternative in the event of the current government's {forced} downfall, an alternative that can take over sharply. Currently the force prepared to take over from the current government is that of the Taliban, and in comparison to them the public in Afghanistan favors the current government…” Payam-e-Mojahid. June 4, 2006

Payam-e-Mojahid is the official unregulated canon of Jamiyat-Islami, the Rabani group, and on more occasions so than not it encompasses the views of Jamiat's dissident group Shurai Nezar. Apart from sympathizing with the bandits that burned and looted Kabul on May 29, the publication in an editorial discusses the group's position towards the current wave of instability in Afghanistan, and portrays its opinion as representative of the general feeling among the masses in Afghanistan. The writer makes it look like the people are all out for an overthrow of the current government, the government that they themselves—with a clear majority—voted into office braving the guns and the snow, threats and freezing cold. It is absurd to grant a publication like Payam-e-Mojahid the credibility to speak for the masses in Afghanistan—it does not have that credibility if the people running it are to be examined, and their associations. Period. And taking their claims seriously is in no means in order—but taking their claims, and projections, as an indication of the bumps and length of the road Afghanistan has to walk is a wise thing to do.

Strikes me as a surprise, and a sad one, that things such as an armed revolt against the government are even being discussed and written about, with the explanation that the only factor that is keeping away the armed revolt from materializing--according to the writer of the editorial above-- is the unattractiveness of the alternative to the government. It is a pity that the rational of it is not even a point that people like the ones writing the piece consider worth entertaining--the rational of revolting against a government that the people voted into office. And the rational of using force, when reason is the need.

It shouldn’t surprise you that this same publication speaks for some parliamentarians who today earn a fortune through the instruments of a democratic rule – their monthly salary is 30 times more than that of the average government official in Afghanistan. They earned this privilege by claiming their conformability to democratic values—and to civil order. It is a shame that these people had the means to deter an all out resentment against them—and that they managed to stay in the policy and the politics circle 4 years after the transition of Afghanistan started. These are the forces that, at the very least, could not be detached from the miseries Kabul went through between 1992 and 1996. And they are promising more of their distinct inhumanity by reminding us of the haunting images of a city in chaos— the Kabul of 1992 to 1996. This through the unbearable acts of May 29 in Kabul, and the unimaginable irrationality of the projections that an armed revolt against the government is a considerable option, only subject to the alternative’s attractiveness. The rational is what they don’t bother to care about, the ideals behind an elected government are what they don’t give a damn about, and the principle of respect for the institutions regardless of who is in charge in a particular period of time, is what you can never expect them to abide by.

"خر عيسی را گر به مکه برند چو برگردد باز همان خرست"
"If Christ’s dolt was given a tour of Mecca , upon return it will remain that same old dolt. "